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Klein: New Paths For The Court

NEW PATHS FOR THE COURT:
PROTECTIONS AFFORDED JUVENILES UNDER MIRANDA;
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL; AND HABEAS
CORPUS DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S 2010/2011
TERM
Richard Klein*

I.

INTRODUCTION

During the 2010/2011 Term, the Supreme Court continued to
engage in two of the trends that have been established over the past
couple of decades: first, that the Court treats juveniles differently
than adults,1 and, second, that the Court seeks to limit federal review
of state convictions, especially in cases involving claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and habeas corpus.2 In the cases of this
Term, the Court reemphasized its previous holdings and sought to
*

Bruce K. Gould Distinguished Professor of Law, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law
Center; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1972. Special thanks to Daniel Fier and Robert Mitchell
for their diligent research and invaluable editing assistance with this article.
1
See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (holding that a defendant
that was fifteen years old at the time he was convicted of first-degree murder cannot be sentenced to death pursuant to the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments); Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (stating that the Court‘s ―acceptance of juvenile courts distinct from
the adult criminal justice system assumes that juvenile offenders constitutionally may be
treated differently from adults‖); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968) (stating
that the State‘s ―power . . . to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its
authority over adults‖ (quoting Prince v. Commonwealth, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (internal
quotation marks omitted))). During this Term, the Court focused particularly on the treatment of juveniles under the prophylactic rule established in its holding in Miranda v. Arizona. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2398-99 (2011); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966) (holding that the accused must be clearly informed of his
right to remain silent, that what he says can and will be used against him at trial, that he has
the right to have an attorney present during questioning, and that if he is indigent, the court
may appoint an attorney for him at no cost to him).
2
See Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011); Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733
(2011); Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011); Felkner v. Jackson, 131 S. Ct. 1305
(2011).
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expound upon them to provide clearer guidance to the federal judiciary to utilize in its review of state court decisions relating to the validity of a criminal conviction.
II.

TREATMENT OF JUVENILES BY THE SUPREME COURT

The Supreme Court‘s holding in Roper v. Simmons3 is just
one recent example of the special considerations juveniles have received as far as protections afforded under our Constitution.4 In Roper, the Court held that a death penalty sentence for a juvenile under
the age of eighteen constituted a violation of the Eighth Amendment
protection against cruel and unusual punishment.5 This determination that juveniles need to be treated differently than adults was reinforced by the Court‘s holding in a case during last year‘s Term, Graham v. Florida.6 The Court in Graham determined that the juvenile
defendant‘s life sentence in prison without the chance of parole in a
non-homicide case constituted cruel and unusual punishment under
the Eighth Amendment.7 Juveniles must, at a minimum, have a meaningful opportunity to obtain release from incarceration at some point
in their lives in such cases.8 The defendant in Graham was resentenced in February of 2012 to a prison term of 25 years.9
3

543 U.S. 551 (2005).
See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010); Thompson, 487 U.S. 815; Bellotti,
443 U.S. 622; Ginsberg, 390 U.S. 629.
5
Roper, 543 U.S. at 578 (―The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of
the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed.‖); U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (―Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.‖).
6
130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
7
Id. at 2034. The Attorney General of Florida expressed satisfaction that ―the ruling does
not prohibit ‗very stern sentences for juveniles.‘ ‖ John Kelly, Will Ruling Save All Lifers?,
YOUTH TODAY, June 1, 2010, available at http://www.youthtoday.org/view
_article.cfm?article_id=4031.
8
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034 (―A State need not guarantee the offender eventual release,
but if it imposes a sentence of life it must provide him or her with some realistic opportunity
to obtain release before the end of that term.‖).
9
Phone Interview by Daniel Fier with Bryan S. Gowdy, Attorney for Terrence Graham
(Mar. 7, 2012) (―The defendant Graham was sentenced to 25 years in prison to be followed
by two years of community control and three subsequent years of probation. The defendant
will not be eligible for parole at any point prior to the expiration of his prison sentence; however he may be eligible for Gaintime. Gaintime may serve to reduce his sentence by 15%, to
a total of 21.25 years to be served. When he is released, Graham will be approximately thirty-eight years old.‖). For clarification on Gaintime in Florida, see FAQ: Gaintime, FL.
4
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During this year‘s Term, the Court considered yet another
case in which it determined that juveniles should receive different
treatment than that which adults are given by the courts. In J.D.B. v.
North Carolina,10 the Court examined the issue of whether a juvenile
should receive greater protection under the rules established in Miranda v. Arizona11 due to his or her immaturity or heightened vulnerability.12 In J.D.B., the suspect in question, a thirteen year-old seventh grader, was escorted out of his social studies classroom by a
police officer and then brought into a conference room where another
officer, along with a school administrator and assistant principal, was
present.13 J.D.B. was then questioned for thirty to forty-five minutes
about two break-ins of homes that had occurred five days earlier.14
At no point during his interrogation was J.D.B. read his Miranda
warnings, informed of his right to leave, or given the opportunity to
contact his legal guardian.15 While in the apparent custody of the officers, J.D.B. eventually ―confessed that he and a friend were responsible for the break-ins.‖16 At this point, J.D.B. was first informed of
his Miranda rights.17
The issues the Court was concerned with in J.D.B. were
whether the suspect was actually in police custody when he was
questioned, whether the subsequent statements made could be used
against him since no Miranda warnings had been given, and lastly,
whether the suspect‘s age should play a role in such an analysis.18
The traditional test to determine whether an individual is in custody,

DEP‘T OF CORRECTIONS, http://www.dc.state.fl.us/oth/inmates/gaintime.html (last visited
Mar. 7, 2012).
10
131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
11
384 U.S. 436 (1966); see supra information accompanying note 1.
12
J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2401 (―[The Court] granted certiorari to determine whether the Miranda custody analysis includes consideration of a juvenile suspect‘s age.‖).
13
Id. at 2399.
14
Id. (Police also questioned J.D.B.‘s grandmother regarding the break-ins. The officers
were later informed by the school that a digital camera, one of the items reported stolen, was
found in J.D.B.‘s possession.).
15
Id.
16
Id. at 2400.
17
J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2400 (stating that only after J.D.B‘s admission did [Investigator]
DiCostanzo ―inform[] J.D.B. that he could refuse to answer the investigator‘s questions and
that he was free to leave‖).
18
Id. at 2401.
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established in the cases following Miranda,19 is whether a reasonable
person in that individual‘s position would have understood that he or
she was free to terminate questioning and leave the room.20 In
Berkemer v. McCarty,21 the Court determined that such a test should
be objectively applied, and that subjective factors—such as intelligence, age, and occupation—should not be taken into consideration.22
The issue in J.D.B. was whether age should be a factor in the overall
determination of whether a suspect knew that he was free to leave the
location where the police questioning was being conducted.
In a five-four decision, the Court in J.D.B. held that the age of
the suspect, while not necessarily a determinative factor, is crucial in
determining whether the suspect knew he was free to leave while being interrogated by a police officer.23 In a strongly worded opinion,
Justice Sotomayor, writing for the Court,24 stated that:
To hold, as the State requests, that a child‘s age is
never relevant to whether a suspect has been taken into custody—and thus to ignore the very real differences between children and adults—would be to deny
children the full scope of the procedural safeguards
that Miranda guarantees to adults.25
19

See, e.g., Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 113 (1995) (holding that the determination of whether an individual would understand that they were in custody or that they could
terminate interrogation ―presents a ‗mixed question of law and fact‘ qualifying for independent review‖); Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994) (holding that in order to
determine whether a person was actually in custody, ―a court must examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, but ‗the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there
[was] a ‗formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement‘ of the degree associated with a
formal arrest‘ ‖ (alteration in original) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125
(1983))); Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990) (―Questioning by captors, who appear
to control the suspect‘s fate, may create mutually reinforcing pressures that the Court has
assumed will weaken the suspect‘s will . . . .‖).
20
J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2402 (citing Thompson, 516 U.S. 99).
21
468 U.S. 420 (1984).
22
Id. at 442 n.35 (―[A]n objective, reasonable-man test is appropriate because . . . it ‗is not
solely dependent either on the self-serving declarations of the police officers or the defendant nor does it place upon the police the burden of anticipating the frailties or idiosyncracies [sic] of every person whom they question.‘ ‖).
23
J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2406 (stating that consideration of a suspect‘s age ―is consistent
with the objective nature of [a custody analysis]‖).
24
Justice Sotomayor was joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan in the
majority opinion. Id. at 2398.
25
Id. at 2407.
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The Court in J.D.B. explained that in cases such as this, ―the custody
analysis would be nonsensical absent some consideration of the suspect‘s age.‖26 The Court concluded that a child in a similar position
to J.D.B. would be much more likely to submit to police questioning,
and much less likely to understand that he or she was free to leave
than would an adult.27 The Court observed that this was a ―commonsense reality.‖28 The Court cited the Brief for Center on Wrongful
Convictions of Youth et al.29 in concluding that there exists a heightened risk of false confessions among minors, especially those in a
position similar to J.D.B.‘s.30 The line between a truthful and false
confession, the Court went on to state, is blurred even further due to
the ―inherently coercive nature of custodial interrogation.‖31 The police not only failed to tell J.D.B. that he was free to leave, but also did
not provide him with the opportunity to call his legal guardian–his
grandmother.32
The dissent emphasized that the holding of J.D.B. marks a
point where the Court may have begun a slide down a slippery slope
when it comes to determining whether someone would reasonably
understand that he or she was in custody.33 By including a consideration of the suspect‘s age in such a custody analysis, the Court may
have been opening the door to any variety of personal characteristics
that could impact such a test.34 Justice Alito proceeded to stress that
since its inception, the criteria to determine whether one was in cus26

Id. at 2405.
Id. at 2403 (―[A] reasonable child subjected to police questioning will sometimes feel
pressured to submit [to interrogation] when a reasonable adult would feel free to go.‖).
28
J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2399.
29
Brief for Center on Wrongful Convictions of Youth et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2010 WL 5385329, at *21 (collecting
empirical studies that ―illustrate the heightened risk of false confessions from youth‖).
30
Id.; J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2401.
31
J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2401, 2403 (stating that young age and immaturity would increase
the likelihood of a false confession).
32
Id. at 2399.
33
Id. at 2409 (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that by allowing consideration of age in a custody analysis, ―the Court will[, in the future,] be forced to choose between two unpalatable
alternatives[:]‖ first, to ―limit [its] decision [in J.D.B.] by arbitrarily distinguishing a suspect‘s age from other personal characteristics,‖ or second, ―to effect a fundamental transformation of the Miranda custody test . . . into a highly fact-intensive standard resembling the
voluntariness test that the Miranda Court found to be unsatisfactory‖).
34
Id.
27
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tody were to be applied objectively, and, any subsequent subjective
consideration would devalue and further obscure Miranda.35
Justice Alito‘s concern was that the Court‘s holding would dilute the clarity of Miranda—one of the chief justifications, the Justice
claimed, for its existence.36 By combining Miranda‘s objective application with subjective considerations, it was questioned whether
there is any longer any justification for Miranda itself. ―[U]nless the
Miranda custody rule is . . . to be radically transformed into one that
. . . account[s for] the wide range of individual characteristics that are
relevant in determining whether a confession is voluntary, the Court
must shoulder the burden of explaining why age is different [and deserves consideration apart] from these other personal characteristics.‖37
III.

EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND PETITIONS FOR
HABEAS CORPUS

In the 2010 Term, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed a number
of habeas corpus cases involving claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel.38 A common theme resonated from each of these: there will
be a reduction of federal review of criminal convictions, which occurred in the state courts.39
In Cullen v. Pinholster,40 the defendant was convicted of first
degree murder and sentenced to the death penalty.41 In 1982, the defendant, Scott Pinholster, and two accomplices, were involved in a
robbery at the home of a local drug dealer.42 After they broke into
the home and ransacked the place, two friends of the drug dealer un35
Id. at 2415 (―If the Court chooses [to extend its holding in J.D.B.], then a core virtue of
Miranda—the ‗ease and clarity of its application‘—will be lost.‖ (quoting Moran v. Burbine,
475 U.S. 412, 425 (1986))).
36
J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2415.
37
Id. at 2414.
38
See Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388; Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733; Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770.
39
See Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1398 (―We now hold that [federal habeas] review . . . is
limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.‖); Moore, 131 S. Ct. at 742 (―[S]ubstantial deference must be accorded to counsel‘s
judgment.‖); Richter, 131 S. Ct at 785 (―A state court must be granted deference and latitude
. . . .‖).
40
131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011).
41
Id. at 1396.
42
Id. at 1394.
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expectedly arrived on the scene.43 After the friends threatened to call
the police, Pinholster used a buck knife and repeatedly stabbed both
men in the chest.44 Pinholster robbed the victims, kicked one of them
many times in the head, and left the scene.45 Both men died from
their injuries.46 The proceeds of the robbery were twenty-three dollars and a quarter ounce of marijuana.47 Two weeks after the crime,
one of Pinholster‘s accomplices turned himself into the police and
turned state witness;48 Pinholster was ultimately found guilty of two
counts of first-degree murder.49 Subsequently, Pinholster exhausted
all state remedies for review of his conviction.50
There are potentially two separate stages in the prosecution of
death penalty cases: the guilt phase and the penalty phase.51 During

43

Id.
Id. at 1394-95.
45
Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1395.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1395.
51
Id.; see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 240 (1972) (per curiam). Furman is the
seminal case which temporarily stopped all death penalty sentencing and executions in the
United States, because certain state death penalty laws created an arbitrary manner in which
death was imposed. The Court in Furman held that the ―carrying out of the death penalty in
these cases constitute[d] cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.‖ 408 U.S. at 240; see id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring) (―[T]he
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed.‖); cf. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976). In Gregg, the case that reestablished death penalty sentencing in the United States, the Court stated that:
Furman did not hold that the infliction of the death penalty Per se violates the Constitution‘s ban on cruel and unusual punishments . . . . Because of the uniqueness of the death penalty, Furman held that it could
not be imposed under sentencing procedures that created a substantial
risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188; see id. at 191-92 (―When a human life is at stake and when the jury
must have information prejudicial to the question of guilt but relevant to the question of penalty in order to impose a rational sentence, a bifurcated system is more likely to ensure elimination of the constitutional deficiencies identified in Furman.‖); id. at 206 (―The new . . .
sentencing procedures . . . focus the jury‘s attention on the particularized nature of the crime
and the particularized characteristics of the individual defendant. [T]he jury is permitted to
consider any aggravating or mitigating circumstances.‖); id. at 207 (―[W]e hold that the statutory system under which Gregg was sentenced to death does not violate the Constitution.‖).
44
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the guilt phase, the jury‘s responsibility is to make the determination
as to whether the defendant is guilty of the murder with which he is
charged.52 If guilt is found, then the penalty phase begins.53 At the
penalty phase, the job of the same jury is to determine whether the
aggravating factors related to the defendant and to the nature of the
crime outweigh any possible mitigating factors.54 An aggravating
circumstance is a factor that increases ―the degree of moral culpabili52

Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1395.
Id.
54
Id. at 1395-96; see also Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 181 (2006) (stating the Court
held that a ―capital sentencing system, which directs the imposition of the death penalty
when a jury finds that aggravating and mitigating circumstances are in equipoise, is constitutional‖). The facts established that Michael Marsh broke into the unoccupied home of the
Marry Ane Pusch. Marsh, 548 U.S. at 166. Upon her return, Marsh repeatedly shot her and
slashed her throat. Id. Marsh set fire to the home, and Ms. Pusch‘s 19-month-old daughter
was burned to death. Id. (―The jury found beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of . . .
aggravating circumstances, and that those circumstances were not outweighed by any mitigating circumstances.‖).
[Here the State] bears the additional burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating circumstances are not outweighed by mitigating circumstances. [T]he defendant appropriately bears the burden of
proffering mitigating circumstances—a burden of production—he never
bears the burden of demonstrating that mitigating circumstances outweigh aggravating circumstances. Instead, the State always has the burden of demonstrating that mitigating evidence does not outweigh aggravating evidence.
Id. at 178-79. See generally Brief for Petitioner, Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163 (2006) (No.
04-1170) 2005 WL 3157602, at *18-19. In the brief, the petitioner states:
Arizona‘s capital sentencing law . . . operates in functionally the same
manner as the Kansas law. Idaho‘s law is likewise differently worded,
but similar in function. [S]ome states have adopted capital sentencing
laws with different weighing equations [those states include Ohio and
Indiana]. And other states, including Texas, have chosen to adopt capital
sentencing systems with no weighing equation whatsoever . . . yet this
Court has found it to be constitutional.
Id.; Brief for Petitioner as Amici Curiae in Supporting Petitioner, Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S.
163 (2006) (No. 04-1170) 2005 WL 1986025, at *2 (―[N]umerous States . . . do not currently
require any weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors [those states include Georgia,
Louisiana, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, and Washington].‖); see also
Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 306-07 (1990) (―The presence of aggravating circumstances serves the purpose of limiting the class of death-eligible defendants, and the
Eighth Amendment does not require that these aggravating circumstances be further refined
or weighed by a jury.‖). The Court has held only that a sentencer must consider any mitigating factors and has ―emphasized the need for a broad inquiry into all relevant mitigating evidence . . . [and the State must] not preclude the jury from giving effect to any relevant mitigating evidence.‖ Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 276 (1998).
53
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ty or blame‖ of the defendant in regards to the murder committed.55
A mitigating circumstance decreases ―the degree of moral culpability
of blame‖ and ―fairness or mercy may be considered‖ to ―justify a
sentence of less than death‖ for a defendant in a capital crime case.56
The Court has determined that a statute that limits or prevents a jury
from considering any and all mitigating factors which are offered by
the defense ―creates [a] risk the death penalty will be imposed‖ and
that risk is incompatible with the requirements of the Fourteenth and
Eight Amendments.57 If aggravators outweigh, or are in equipoise
with, mitigators, the jury is allowed to impose the death penalty.58
In Pinholster, the claim was the defendant was not provided
the effective assistance of counsel59 in that defendant‘s counsel failed
to take necessary steps to address the mitigating issues to the jury.60
Specifically, the defense attorney had never mentioned the defendant‘s existing medical records.61 Therefore, jurors were not exposed
to any expert testimony regarding the defendant‘s epileptic condition,
incidents of head trauma received from two automobile accidents, nor
the fact that as a twelve-year-old he was sent to a mental institution.62
The Supreme Court of California upheld the death penalty,63
55

See Marsh, 548 U.S. at 176; see also Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 593 (2002) (stating
that some examples of aggravating circumstances might include a defendant: ―knowingly
create[ing] a grave risk of death to another person or persons in addition to‖ the murdered
victim during the offense, receiving money for the commission of a murder, committing the
offense ―in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner,‖ and committing the offense
while in custody or on probation). Other aggravating factors could pertain to age of victim,
for example, under fifteen or over seventy-five years old, or the number of victims, or the
profession of the victim, for example, a law enforcement officer or a judge, and any prior
convictions of the defendant. Ring, 536 U.S. at 593.
56
See Marsh, 548 U.S. at 176; see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978). The
Court held that:
[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer . . .
not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of
a defendant‘s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.
Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 (emphasis in original).
57
Id. at 605.
58
Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1396; see also Marsh, 548 U.S. at 179-80.
59
Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1396.
60
Id. (stating defense counsel ―failed to adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence, including evidence of mental disorders‖).
61
Id. at 1395.
62
Id. at 1409.
63
Id. at 1397.
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and, accordingly, the defendant sought habeas corpus relief in the
federal system.64 The District Court proceeded to conduct a hearing
where new psychiatric evidence was introduced.65 The evidence indicated that the defendant had a record of serious mental problems.66
The District Court granted the habeas relief petition ―for inadequacy
of counsel by failure to investigate and present mitigation evidence at
the penalty hearing.‖67 In an en banc decision, the Ninth Circuit confirmed the overturning of the death penalty based upon ineffective assistance of counsel.68 However, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
and a habeas review was conducted under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), 69 as
amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (―AEDPA‖).70
The Supreme Court determined that its review would be
strictly limited to what had been presented at the California state
court level.71 The consideration of the new evidence by the District
Court and the Ninth Circuit was labeled as inappropriate.72 The evidence presented to the California Supreme Court and that court‘s de64

Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1397.
Id.
66
Id. (stating expert medical witnesses testified the defendant suffered from ―organic personality syndrome‖ and ―epilepsy and brain injury‖).
67
Id.
68
Id. (―Taking the District Court evidence into account, the en banc court determined that
the California Supreme Court unreasonably . . . den[ied] Pinholster‘s claim of penalty-phase
ineffective assistance of counsel.‖).
69
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006). § 2254(d) reads as follows:
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted
with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State
court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
Id.
70
Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1398; see also Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214.
71
Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1398 (―We now hold that review . . . is limited to the record
that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.‖).
72
Id. at 1401 (―[W]e conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in considering the District
Court evidence in its review . . . .‖).
65
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cision on the matter based on that evidence is all that should be reviewed.73 AEDPA requires overturning a conviction or a sentence
only if the sentence or the conviction was found to be unreasonable,74
and a high degree of deference is to be given to the state court. 75 The
role of the federal court is only to review a state court‘s decision as of
the time it was made.76 Therefore, a very high level of deference is
required to be given to the state court‘s holding as to the effectiveness
and competency of the defense attorney in this matter.77
The crucial case that governs claims based on ineffective assistance of counsel has been Strickland v. Washington.78 The first
part of the Strickland decision requires the courts to be deferential to
an attorney‘s strategic choices.79 In a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, competence shall be presumed.80 In Pinholster, the Court
again re-emphasized that the courts are to be highly deferential in determining whether or not an attorney was effective.81 The holding,
furthermore, highlights an apparent need for what can be classified as
a doubly highly deferential standard.82 A state court is to be highly
deferential when it reviews whether counsel was effective, 83 and this
73

Id. at 1398 (―[R]eview is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. [The defendant] contends that evidence presented to the
federal habeas court may also be considered. We agree with the State.‖).
74
Id. at 1402 (―In these circumstances, [the defendant] can satisfy the ‗unreasonable application prong‘ . . . only by showing that ‗there was no reasonable basis‘ for the California
Supreme Court‘s decision.‖ (quoting Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784)).
75
Id. at 1398 (stating there is a ― ‗highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court
rulings‘ ‖ (quoting Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002))).
76
Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1399 (―Limiting . . . review to the state-court record is consistent with our precedents . . . .‖).
77
Id. at 1403 (―[C]ounsel should be ‗strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional
judgment . . . .‘ ‖ (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984))).
78
466 U.S. 688 (1984).
79
Id. at 689 (―Judicial scrutiny of counsel‘s performance must be highly deferential.‖).
80
See Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1403. But see Richard Klein, The Constitutionalization of
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 MD. L. REV. 1433, 1477 (1999). The Strickland opinion
has been widely criticized as one which has allowed many convictions to be upheld in spite
of the clear incompetence of defense counsel.
81
Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1407 (―Strickland specifically commands that a court ‗must
indulge [the] strong presumption‘ that counsel ‗made all significant decisions in the exercise
of reasonable professional judgment.‘ ‖ (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90)).
82
Id. at 1403 (―Our review of the California Supreme Court‘s decision is thus ‗doubly
deferential.‘ ‖ (quoting Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009))).
83
See, e.g., id. at 1402 (stating that the California Supreme Court denied each petition as
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is followed by the federal courts acting in a highly deferential manner
in the assessment of the state court‘s decision.84 The double deferential standard governs the Supreme Court‘s review of ineffectiveness
claims; Justice Thomas‘s decision was very clear: ―[o]ur review . . .
is thus ‗doubly deferential.‘ ‖85
In Pinholster, the main issue was whether the Ninth Circuit
acted improperly in considering new evidence not presented during
the trial.86 In a very forceful dissent, Justice Sotomayor, joined in
part by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan, chastised the Court‘s decision.87 In Sotomayor‘s view, the majority held that even if it is abundantly clear that a defendant would be entitled to habeas relief due to
new evidence being brought to the attention of a federal district court,
the courts are to turn a blind eye to it.88 The reasoning for the failure
to provide relief would be that the new evidence was not presented
before the state court at the time at which the state court‘s decision
was determined.89 Sotomayor suggests possible impropriety in the
Court‘s holding; she wrote, ―[T]he majority omits critical details relating to the performance of [the] trial counsel, the mitigating evidence they failed to discover, and the history of these proceedings.‖90
She concludes by highlighting the fact that the trial lawyer did virtually no investigation in the death penalty case and never looked into
what would be the most significant factors to raise in possible mitigation.91
The new evidence revealed in the federal district court hearhaving no merits).
84
See id. at 1398 (stating a ― ‗highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that the state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.‘ ‖ (quoting Woodford, 537 U.S. at 24)).
85
Id. at 1403 (quoting Knowles, 556 U.S. at 123).
86
Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1397 (stating the Court of Appeals ―determined that new evidence from the hearing could be considered‖).
87
Id. at 1413 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (stating ―[t]his holding is unnecessary . . . and it
is inconsistent with . . . our precedents.‖).
88
Id. (―[F]ederal courts must turn a blind eye to new evidence in deciding whether a petitioner has satisfied . . . [a] threshold obstacle to federal habeas relief – even when it is clear
that the petitioner would be entitled to relief in light of that evidence.‖).
89
Id. (stating the ―analysis is limited to the state-court record‖).
90
Id. at 1422.
91
Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1435 (―[T]he evidence confirmed what was already apparent
from the state-court record: [the defense] counsel failed to conduct an adequate mitigation
investigation . . . .‖).
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ing raised important issues that sharply contrasted with the evidence
heard by the jury which was determining whether there was any possible mitigation.92 There were new revelations that the defendant suffered organic brain damage, mental disease, childhood beatings, abandonment, and a family history filled with violence and mental
illness.93 Additional facts which were revealed included information
that a psychiatrist had recommended shortly before the murder that
had taken place that the defendant be admitted to a psychiatric facility because he was diagnosed as suffering from severe psychosis.94
This type of evidence certainly has the potential of being highly significant.95 Historically in death penalty cases, when a jury assesses
mitigating factors the existence of a mental disorder may lead jurors
to find the defendant less culpable, and therefore not as responsible
for the murder, because of the debilitating effects associated with
mental illness.96
Another decision of the Court which involved a habeas corpus
matter, Premo v. Moore,97 shifted focus to the plea bargaining arena
and also involved an ineffective counsel claim.98 In December of
1995, the defendant, Randy Moore, and two accomplices attacked
Kenneth Rogers99 by assaulting him in his home and tying him up
with duct tape.100 Moore and his two accomplices threw Rogers in a
car truck and drove to a desolate area in the Oregon countryside.101

92

See id. (―The additional evidence presented at the hearing only confirmed that the California Supreme Court could not reasonably have rejected [the defendant‘s] claim.‖).
93
Id. at 1434 (stating expert testimony included the defendant suffering from ―childhood
head traumas, history of epilepsy, abusive and neglected upbringing, history of substance
abuse, and bizarre behavior‖ and ―antisocial personality disorder‖).
94
Id. at 1425 (―Just months before the homicides, a doctor recommended placement in the
Hope Psychiatric Institute, but this did not occur.‖).
95
Id. at 1432 (―[I]t was especially important for counsel to present the available evidence
to help the jury understand [the defendant].‖).
96
See Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1433 (―[I]t is not a foregone conclusion, as the majority
deems it, that a juror familiar with [the defendant‘s] troubled background and psychiatric
issues would have reached the same conclusion regarding [the defendant‘s] culpability.‖).
97
131 S. Ct. 733 (2011).
98
Id. at 738 (―The instant case . . . concerns the adequacy of representation in providing
an assessment of a plea bargain without first seeking suppression of a confession assumed to
have been improperly obtained.‖).
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
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Upon arriving at the isolated area, it was maintained that Moore shot
Rogers in the temple and killed him.102 Moore told the police that he
only wanted to scare Rogers;103 the plan was to leave Rogers in an
unknown area and force him to walk home alone.104 Moore claimed
he took the gun from one of his accomplices,105 and at the time
Moore grabbed the gun, Rogers ―slipped backwards in the mud and
the gun discharged.‖106
The defendant‘s lawyer advised his client to take a plea of
three hundred months to a felony murder charge.107 The defense
lawyer had not engaged in any attempt to have the defendant‘s confession or previous statement to a police officer held to be inadmissible.108 Instead, the lawyer completely bypassed such motion and
simply advised the defendant to enter the plea.109 The defendant did,
102

Moore, 131 S. Ct. at 738.
Id.; see Brief for Respondent, Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733 (2011) (No. 09-658)
2010 WL 3251630, at *2 (―[T]he prosecutor stated at Mr. Moore‘s sentencing, after Rogers
had burglarized the home of a mutual friend, Moore and several other men ‗were going to
take [Rogers] out into the woods, release him and let him walk home, basically, to put the
fear of God in him at least.‘ ‖ (second alteration in the original)).
104
Moore, 131 S. Ct. at 738.
105
Id.; see Brief for the Respondent, supra note 103, at *2 (―While walking up [a] hill,
one of the other men fell in the mud. Mr. Moore took the gun.‖).
106
Moore, 131 S. Ct. at 738; see Brief for the Respondent, supra note 103, at *2 (―Shortly
after, Rogers slipped and fell into Mr. Moore and the gun discharged, killing Rogers.‖).
107
Moore, 131 S. Ct. at 738; see also Brief for the Respondent, supra note 103, at *3.
Two days after the shooting, Mr. Moore went to the police station with his half-brother, Lonnie Woolhiser (the man who fell first on
the hill), his brother, Raymond, and his half-brother‘s girlfriend, Debbie
Zeigler. Either on the ride or before, Mr. Moore told Raymond and
Zeigler something about the incident. When questioned by the police,
Mr. Moore placed himself at the scene, admitted his participation in taking Rogers to the hill, and described the shooting accident. This taperecorded statement was obtained through promises of leniency and after
the police ignored Mr. Moore‘s request for counsel.
Mr. Moore‘s attorney failed to recognize that the police had unconstitutionally obtained the statement and did not move for its suppression.
Shortly after entering his plea of nolo contendere, Mr. Moore
decided to seek to withdraw it, but was talked out of those efforts.
Id.
108
Moore, 131 S. Ct. at 740 (―The question becomes whether [the defendant‘s] counsel
provided ineffective assistance by failing to seek suppression of [the defendant‘s] confession
to police before advising [the defendant] regarding the plea.‖).
109
Id. at 738 (stating defense lawyer did ―not file[ ] a motion to suppress [the] confession
103
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upon the advice of counsel, enter a plea of no contest to the
charges.110 Subsequently, the defendant filed a claim that the defense
attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel.111 The basis for
the petition was that the lawyer did not pursue a challenge to the confession or the statement to the police officer.112 The petition alleged
that there were some very legitimate challenges to the defendant‘s
statement to the police that could have and should have been pursued.113 The failure of the lawyer to have engaged in what could
have proven to be a crucial pretrial motion, was claimed to constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel.114
The Ninth Circuit granted the defendant‘s petition for habeas
corpus relief.115 The court held the state court‘s conclusion that the
defense lawyer did not act ineffectively was unreasonable. 116 The
Ninth Circuit held Moore‘s taped confession to the police was highly
damaging and unconstitutionally obtained, therefore, defense counsel‘s failure to suppress the confession did not meet an ―objective
standard of reasonableness‖ and ―constituted deficient performance‖
of counsel.117 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, Justice Kennedy
wrote the majority opinion.118 Kennedy relied on the Strickland declaration that courts have a limited role in assessing a lawyer‘s compe-

to police in advance of the . . . advice that [the defendant] considered before accepting the
plea‖).
110
Id. (stating defendant ―agreed to plead no contest to felony murder in exchange for a
sentence of 300 months‖).
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Moore, 131 S. Ct. at 742 (stating the defendant‘s claim ―that it was an accident when
he shot the victim‖).
114
See id. at 738. Defense ―[c]ounsel . . . justified his decision by asserting that any motion to suppress was likely to fail.‖ Id. at 741.
115
Id. at 739.
116
Id. (―In [the Ninth Circuit‘s] view[,] the state court‘s conclusion that counsel‘s action
did not constitute ineffective assistance was an unreasonable application of clearly established law.‖).
117
Moore v. Czerniak, 574 F.3d 1092, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009); id. at 1104 (―[T]he confession unconstitutionally obtained by the police was so critical to the prosecution and so damaging to Moore . . . .‖); id. at 1107 (―[T]he [S]tate has conceded that a motion to suppress
Moore‘s confession would have succeeded. Further, Moore‘s counsel did not ‗reasonably‘
reach his erroneous conclusion [not to file a motion to suppress], as he was entirely ignorant
of the relevant law.‖).
118
Moore, 131 S. Ct. at 737-39.
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tence.119 The opinion emphasized that lawyers must have the freedom to engage in strategic choices and the ability to make tactical decisions.120 Therefore, the courts should substantially defer to the
course of action a lawyer opted to take.121 A particular concern that
might well arise from the Moore holding is that the Supreme Court
seemed willing to sacrifice a meaningful examination of the effective
assistance of counsel claim in the Court‘s desire for finality.122 The
Court expressed the desirability and needs of the criminal justice system for the plea bargaining process, and that pleas were presumed to
be conclusive.123
In Hill v. Lockhart,124 the Court held that the two-part Strickland test is to apply to challenges to plea bargain guilty pleas based
upon claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.125 The first-part of
the test is based upon an assessment of attorney competence.126 The
second-part of the test is a ― ‗prejudice‘ ‖ requirement which focuses
on whether the ineffective assistance of counsel ―affected the outcome of the plea process.‖127 For example, if an attorney failed to
uncover exculpatory evidence, the determination of ―whether the er119

Id. at 741 (―[H]abeas courts must respect their limited role in determining whether
there was manifest deficiency in light of information then available to counsel.‖) (citing
Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993)).
120
Id. (―Plea bargains are the result of complex negotiations suffused with uncertainty,
and defense attorneys must make careful strategic choices in balancing opportunities and
risks.‖).
121
Id. at 740 (―[T]he standard for judging counsel‘s representation is a most deferential
one.‖).
122
Id. at 742 (―The prospect that a plea deal will afterwards be unraveled when a court
second-guesses counsel‘s decisions . . . could lead prosecutors to forgo plea bargains that
would benefit defendants, a result favorable to no one.‖).
123
Moore, 131 S. Ct. at 742 (―Prosecutors must have assurances that a plea will not be
undone years later.‖).
124
474 U.S. 52 (1985).
125
Id. at 58.
126
Id.; see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (stating counsel should be ―strongly presumed to
have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment‖). But see Hill, 474 U.S. at 62 (White, J., concurring) (―The
failure of an attorney to inform his client of the relevant law clearly satisfies the first prong
of the Strickland analysis adopted by the majority, as such an omission cannot be said to fall
within ‗the wide range of professionally competent assistance‘ demanded by the Sixth
Amendment.‖ (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690)).
127
Hill, 474 U.S. at 59; see id. (―In other words, in order to satisfy the ‗prejudice‘ requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.‖).
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ror ‗prejudiced‘ the defendant by causing him to plead guilty rather
than go to trial will depend on the likelihood that discovery of the
evidence would have led counsel to change his recommendation as to
the plea.‖128 This assessment objectively depends on ―whether the
evidence likely would have changed the outcome of the trial.‖129 The
same assessment would be made concerning a defense which could
have possibly been raised at trial and whether the ―defense[s] likely
would have succeeded at trial.‖130 Since the analysis is derived from
the Strickland test, it has proven quite difficult for a defendant to
meet the requirements or burden necessary to have a plea bargain
overturned for ineffective assistance of counsel.131
128

Id.
Id.
130
Id. In March of 2012, the Court greatly expanded the application of the Sixth
Amendment right to other situations involving plea bargaining. In recognizing the vital role
that plea bargaining has in the criminal justice system, the Court declared that the entry of
pleas constituted a ―critical stage‖ of the prosecution and therefore the right to counsel attached. Missouri v. Frye, No. 10–444, 2012 WL 932020, at *6-7 (U.S. March 21, 2012). In
Missouri v. Frye, the defense counsel had failed to inform his client that the prosecutor had
offered a plea deal entailing a recommended sentence of ninety days. Id. at *3. After the
offer had expired, and after once again the defendant had been charged with driving with a
revoked license, the defendant pled guilty and received a sentence of three years. Id. at *3-4.
The Court applied the Strickland test and determined that the lawyer was deficient in failing
to inform his client of the offer, and that the defendant had been prejudiced. Id. at *9-11.
The prejudice determination had two aspects: (1) would the defendant have accepted the plea
offer had he known of it, and (2) would the court have abided by the plea deal. Id. at *9-10.
In Lafler v. Cooper, counsel had incorrectly informed his client that, were he to go to trial on
the attempted murder charge, he could not be convicted because the bullet that was fired had
hit the victim below the waist. No. 10-209, 2012 WL 932019, at *3 (U.S. March 21, 2012).
The pretrial offer by the prosecutor was for a sentence of 51-85 months; the sentence given
by the court after trial was 185-360 months. Id. The Supreme Court held that the incorrect
advice by counsel constituted inadequate representation and that the defendant had indeed
been prejudiced. Id. at *12.
131
Richard Klein, Due Process Denied: Judicial Coercion in the Plea Bargaining
Process, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1349, 1367-68 (2004).
[T]he [Supreme] Court emphasized [in Hill] that because the vast majority of criminal convictions arise from guilty pleas, the need for finality
in judgment [is] particularly great. . . . The standard set forth in Hill for
a defendant to successfully challenge a plea bargain is an exceptionally
demanding one. Once the defendant has entered the guilty plea[,] there
will ordinarily be no appellate review of counsel‘s preparation of the
case. [An] overburdened [defense attorney] knows, therefore, that if his
client pleads guilty, counsel will not be examined as to what investigation or preparation he may have done or failed to have done on his
client‘s case.
Id.
129
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The Moore opinion reinforced the idea that pleas bring ―to the
criminal justice a stability and a certainty that must not be undermined . . . .‖132 The Court emphasized that ―[h]indsight and second
guesses are also inappropriate, and more often so, where a plea has
been entered without a full trial . . . .‖133 The decision again relies on
double deference and Justice Kennedy found that such deference is
highly significant in light of the uncertainty inherent in plea negotiations.134 The Court declared that ―[t]here is a most substantial burden
. . . to show ineffective assistance‖ in cases involving the entrance of
a plea.135 There are several levels of deference at play here: the federal courts are to have a limited role in reviewing what transpired at
the state level; deference ought to be given due to the system‘s need
for finality; and there should be an overall reluctance to find that the
lawyer who recommended acceptance of the plea was ineffective.136
In Harrington v. Richter,137 the Supreme Court granted certiorari following a reversal by the Ninth Circuit of the denial of defendant‘s petition for a writ habeas corpus by the state supreme court
and federal district court.138 The defendant asserted, among other
grounds, that his attorney was ineffective in his assistance at trial.139
Defendant Richter was among four individuals who had been
smoking marijuana at the home of one of the men, Joshua Johnson.140
Officers were later called to the house by Johnson who alleged that
Richter and another man appeared in his bedroom when he awoke
from his sleep.141 Johnson was shot by the other man, and Richter
shot the fourth person, who was still in the living room.142 The two
assailants proceeded to steal Johnson‘s pistol and $6,000 cash.143
Evidence found at the scene, including shell casings, pools of blood,
132

Moore, 131 S. Ct. at 745.
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id. at 745-46 (stating that pleas exist to provide ―stability and a certainty‖ and should
not be emasculated by federal review absent unreasonable action at the state level).
137
131 S. Ct. 770 (2011).
138
Id. at 783.
139
Id.
140
Id. at 781.
141
Id.
142
Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 781.
143
Id.
133
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and blood spatters, corroborated Johnson‘s claims and was used at
trial to convict Richter.144
At trial, the district attorney had called two expert witnesses
who testified in regard to whose blood was found at the scene of the
crime, a matter which was essential to the defendant‘s claim of selfdefense.145 Defense counsel did not present a single expert witness of
his own to challenge or refute the prosecution‘s experts.146 The defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison without parole.147
The defendant‘s writ of habeas corpus to the California Supreme Court asserted ineffective assistance of counsel and was accompanied by affidavits from several experts including a blood serologist, pathologist, and a bloodstain analyst.148 It was claimed that
these affidavits showed that the location and content of the blood
pools, as well as the lack of ―satellite droplets‖ present, meant that
the defendant‘s account of the conflict was the most truthful and such
affidavits would solidify his claim of self-defense.149 The California
Supreme Court summarily denied the writ in a single sentence summary order.150 The defendant then filed a petition for habeas corpus
with the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California asserting the same claims.151 Again, the writ was denied.152
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals initially affirmed the district

144
Id. at 781-82 (―Blood evidence d[id] not appear to have been part of the prosecution‘s
planned case prior to trial, . . . [b]ut the opening statement from the defense[, which highlighted the blood evidence as supporting a claim of self-defense,] led the prosecution to alter its approach.‖).
145
Id. at 782.
146
Id. at 783 (Defendant ―claimed his counsel was deficient for failing to present expert
testimony on serology, pathology, and blood spatter patterns . . . [which] he argued would
disclose the source of the blood pool in the bedroom doorway,‖ a fact which would have
supported his claim of self-defense.).
147
Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 782.
148
Id. at 783.
149
Id.
150
Id.; Phone Interview by Daniel Fier with Cliff Gardner, Esq., attorney for defendant
Richter (Feb. 29, 2012) (―The California Supreme Court‘s summary order simply stated that
the defendant‘s petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied.‖).
151
Richter v. Hickman, No. S-01-CV-0643-JKS, S-01-CV-0963-JKS, 2006 WL 769199
(E.D.Cal. March 24, 2006).
152
Id. at *15 (holding that the defendants‘ claims of ineffective assistance of counsel fail
to meet the burden imposed by the Court‘s holding in Strickland and are therefore denied).
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court‘s decision to deny the petition.153 Defendant subsequently filed
a petition for a rehearing and the Court of Appeals in an en banc
hearing reversed its earlier decision.154
The Supreme Court reviewed the case in order to determine
whether the state court‘s order was an unreasonable adjudication on
the case‘s merits, thereby triggering 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d),155 as
amended by the AEDPA, and, additionally, if the state court incorrectly applied the standard outlined in Strickland.156 In the Court‘s
majority opinion, Justice Kennedy concluded that even though a one
sentence summary order157 makes it difficult to determine whether
there was a reasonable and final determination of the case on the merits, the burden is that of the habeas petitioner to show that the state
court had ―no reasonable basis . . . to deny relief.‖158 The Court‘s
opinion emphasized that courts are entitled and enabled to ―concentrate [their] resources on the cases where opinions are most needed,‖
and, therefore, a single sentence summary order can be fully sufficient to imply an adequate reasonable basis for denying relief under §
2254(d).159
The Court also concluded that even when there exists a strong
case for habeas relief, it does not directly imply that the state court‘s
conclusion to the contrary was unreasonable under the AEDPA.160
153
See Richter v. Hickman, 521 F.3d 1222, 1238 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that there was
no constitutional error at the trial court level which would have resulted in a different outcome, and, therefore, the petition should be denied).
154
Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 783; see Richter v. Hickman, 578 F.3d 944, 947 (9th Cir. 2009)
(holding that defense counsel‘s failure to present expert testimony to refute the State‘s experts represented ineffective assistance of counsel and, therefore, the denial of the petition by
the district court should be reversed).
155
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
156
Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 783-85.
157
See supra information accompanying note 150.
158
Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784; see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 399 (2000)
(holding that habeas relief is appropriate in cases where it can be shown that the court‘s decision was made ―contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law‖); Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991) (stating that a reasoned judgment issued by the state court need not explain every detail of its decision and that the habeas petitioner must demonstrate that the state court‘s decision was unreasonable or not
made on the merits).
159
Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784 (stating that the avoidance of ―collateral attack[s] in federal
court‖ does not, contrary to defendant‘s assertion, comprise all the conditions of which the
court considers when writing its opinions).
160
Id. at 786 (referencing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)).
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The habeas corpus petition does not exist as a secondary remedy for
the correction of state court holdings, but rather, to protect the petitioner against ―extreme malfunctions‖ in the judicial process.161 For
those reasons, the standard that exists for federal courts to grant habeas relief is a substantial one that is difficult to meet.162
The defendant‘s claim for habeas relief based upon the ineffective assistance of defense counsel depends upon whether counsel
gave deficient assistance and if the resulting outcome was prejudiced
due to counsel‘s actions or inactions.163 The Court, once again, emphasized that lawyers are to be given substantial leeway in the strategic and tactical decisions they make, and that a high level of deference is appropriate.164 In its review of the case, the Court
determined that even given the failure of defense counsel to call his
own expert witnesses, there was nothing to indicate that his performance and assistance was ―deficient under Strickland,‖ and, therefore, the state court acted correctly in its utilization of Strickland.165
The Court observed that a battle of the experts is not always necessary for the adequate representation of a defendant and that, in this
case, defense counsel skillfully and appropriately represented his
client, utilizing mechanisms such as cross-examination to defeat
some points of the state‘s expert witnesses.166 Since the state court‘s
application of the standards for assessing possible ineffective assistance of counsel was appropriate, the Court held that the Ninth Circuit erred in reversing the district court‘s decision.167
The Supreme Court reviewed a fourth significant case involv-

161

Id.
Id. (―As amended by AEDPA, § 2254(d) stops short of imposing a complete bar on
federal court relitigation of claims already rejected in state proceedings.‖); see Renico v.
Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1866 (2010) (holding that an incorrect ruling by a state court does not
necessarily render that decision unreasonable pursuant to § 2254(d)); Brown v. Payton, 544
U.S. 133, 147 (2005) (emphasis added) (holding that, absent proof of an unreasonable application of federal law, habeas relief is not available pursuant to § 2254(d)); Lockyer, 538 U.S.
at 77 (holding that the ―gross disproportionality principle‖ regarding California‘s repeat offender law, when applied for the purposes of § 2254(d), is not an unreasonable application of
federal law, and, therefore, defendant‘s petition for habeas relief should be denied).
163
Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 787.
164
Id. at 789.
165
Id. at 791.
166
Id.
167
Id. at 792.
162
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ing a habeas petition this past Term, Felkner v. Jackson,168 also an
appeal from the Ninth Circuit.169 In Jackson, the prosecution had
used two peremptory challenges to strike two black jurors from the
venire.170 Under the Court‘s holding in Batson v. Kentucky,171 race
cannot be used as a basis for a peremptory challenge.172 If such a
challenge is contested by the opposing party, the party that used the
challenge must show that there was a race-neutral basis for the use of
the said challenge.173 The defendant in Jackson had claimed that the
two jurors were struck on the basis of their race,174 to which the prosecution contended that race was not the factor which led to the use of
the challenges.175 It was claimed that the first juror that was challenged had significant involvement with law enforcement officers
and may, therefore, have harbored animosity.176 The second juror
challenged had a background and degree in social work, which, the
prosecutor maintained, may have clouded her judgment in the case.177
The trial court accepted the prosecutor‘s explanation that the second
juror was struck ―based on her educational background,‖ and that the
prosecutor ―does not ‗like to keep social workers‘ ‖ on a jury.178
After losing on appeal in the California Supreme Court, the
defendant filed a petition for habeas relief with the federal court

168

131 S. Ct. 1305 (2011).
Id. at 1307.
170
Id. at 1305.
171
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
172
Id. at 100 (holding that if the trial court is able to come to the determination that there
is a prima facie showing that peremptory challenges were utilized on the basis of race and
the prosecutor is unable to provide a sufficient race-neutral explanation for the use of said
challenges, the challenges at issue are unconstitutional).
173
Id. at 94 (―[T]he State must demonstrate that ‗permissible racially neutral selection criteria and procedures have produced the monochromatic result.‘ ‖ (quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972))).
174
Jackson, 131 S. Ct. at 1305.
175
Id. at 1306.
176
Id. (stating that the juror in question was continuously stopped by police officers between the ages of 16-30, because of–in his words–―his race and age‖).
177
Id. (explaining that the prosecutor believed said juror was prejudiced because of her
previous internship at a jail, which the prosecutor alleged was ―probably in the psych unit as
a sociologist of some sort‖).
178
Id. (holding that the prosecution‘s use of peremptory challenges was race-neutral and
that the defendant failed to meet his burden in proving purposeful discrimination in jury selection).
169

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol28/iss2/3

22

Klein: New Paths For The Court

2012]

NEW PATHS FOR THE COURT

375

based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.179 As was the
case in Richter,180 the federal court reviewed the case pursuant to the
AEDPA and § 2254(d), subsection (2).181 The District Court denied
the defendant‘s petition,182 but the denial was reversed by the Ninth
Circuit.183 The Ninth Circuit offered the following in support of its
decision:
The prosecutor‘s proffered race-neutral bases for peremptorily striking the two African-American jurors
were not sufficient to counter the evidence of purposeful discrimination in light of the fact that two out of
three prospective African-American jurors were
stricken, and the record reflected different treatment of
comparably situated jurors.184
In a strongly worded opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit, and characterized the Circuit‘s decision as
―inexplicable.‖185
In its per curiam opinion, the Court stated that the trial court‘s
review of a Batson challenge is largely based on an ― ‗evaluation of
credibility‘ ‖ and that a ―trial court‘s determination is entitled to
‗great deference.‘ ‖186 Furthermore, federal review of habeas petitions under the AEDPA ― ‗demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.‘ ‖187 In both situations, deference to the
findings of the state trial court is paramount absent the demonstration
179

Jackson, 131 S. Ct. at 1307.
Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 783-85.
181
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
182
Jackson v. Felker, No. CIV 07-0555RJB, 2009 WL 426651, at *10 (E.D.Ca. Feb. 20,
2009) (―The California state court decisions . . . were not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, nor did
they result in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light
of the evidence presented to the state courts.‖).
183
Jackson, 131 S. Ct. at 1307 (―After considering the state Court of Appeal[‘s] decision
and reviewing the record evidence, the District Court held that the California Court of Appeal‘s findings were not unreasonable.‖).
184
Id.
185
Id. (stating that the decision of the Ninth Circuit to reverse the District Court ―is as inexplicable as it is unexplained‖). The Court emphasized that since ―[t]he state appellate
court‘s decision was plainly not unreasonable[,] [t]here was simply no basis for the Ninth
Circuit to reach the opposite conclusion, particularly in such a dismissive manner.‖ Id.
186
Id. (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21).
187
Jackson, 131 S. Ct. at 1307 (quoting Lett, 130 S. Ct. at 1862).
180
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that there was no reasonable basis for the court to have denied relief
to a defendant pursuant to § 2254(d).188 Since the defendant did not
meet its burden of showing such an unreasonable basis, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit‘s decision.189 The language of the Court was
sufficiently harsh that the Journal of the American Bar Association
headlined that the ―Supreme Court Slaps 9th Circuit for ‗Inexplicable‘ Decision in Batson Challenge.‖190
IV.

CONCLUSION

The concept of habeas corpus predates even the Magna Carta,
which, in the year 1215, recognized habeas as part of the ―law of the
land.‖191 The Magna Carta itself states the principle that ―[n]o free
man shall be seized or imprisoned . . . except by the lawful judgment
of his equals or by the law of the land.‖192 Our Constitution reorganized and emphasized the great import of habeas: ―The Privilege of
the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.‖193
The Great Writ, protecting the individual against illegal imprisonment, was referred to by the Supreme Court in Harris v. Nelson194 as
―the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom
against arbitrary and lawless state action.‖195
The powerful nature of the Writ as a guarantor of individual
freedom has been threatened in recent years by a number of Supreme
Court decisions interpreting the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act.196 The holdings of this last Term, however, have been

188

Id.
Id.
190
Debra Cassens Weiss, Supreme Court Slaps 9th Circuit for ‘Inexplicable’ Decision in
Batson
Challenge,
ABA
JOURNAL,
Mar.
21,
2011,
available
at
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/supreme_court_slaps_9th_circuit_for_inexplicable_
decision_in_batson_challen/.
191
The
Text
of
the
Magna
Carta,
FORDHAM
UNIVERSITY,
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/magnacarta.asp (last visited Apr. 3, 2012).
192
Id.
193
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
194
394 U.S. 286 (1969).
195
Id. at 290-91.
196
See, e.g., Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733; Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770; Jackson, 131 S. Ct. 1305;
Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388.
189
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of particular significance in their impact on the Writ‘s functioning as
the ultimate protector of the Sixth Amendment right to the effective
assistance of counsel. The level of concern expressed by many in the
legal profession about these recent holdings can, perhaps, best be illustrated in the following draft of a Resolution of the Defense Function Committee of the Criminal Justice Section of the American Bar
Association197: ―Resolved, that the American Bar Association urge
Congress to restore the Writ of Habeas Corpus by amending 28
U.S.C. [§] 2254(d) to remove unreasonable restrictions on the scope
of the Writ which preclude relief for violations of the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.‖198 The proposed
amendment would provide for the granting of the Writ simply upon a
finding that the state court‘s adjudication of the claim ―resulted in a
decision that was contrary to, or involved a misapplication of, clearly
established Federal law . . . .‖199
In Premo v. Moore,200 a case in which the state had not even
challenged the defendant‘s claim that his confession to the police had
been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights, the Court held
that although counsel had failed to move to suppress the illegally obtained confession, the Writ was to be denied.201 In Harrington v.
Richter,202 the Court emphasized that even when the state court decision denying the defendant‘s constitutional claim is limited to a single sentence, deference must be given to the determination of the
state court.203
The Court‘s statement in Richter that habeas protects only
when there have been ―extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,‖204 was strengthened by the Court‘s decision in Cullen
v. Pinholster.205 In Pinholster, the Court held that any review of a
state court conviction is to be strictly limited to the evidence and

197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205

The author of this article is a member of the Committee.
A copy of the proposed Resolution is on file with the Touro Law Review.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
131 S. Ct. 733 (2011).
Id. at 744-46.
131 S. Ct. 770 (2011).
Id. at 784-85.
Id. at 786 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979)).
131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011).
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record that was made at the state court level.206
In J.D.B. v. North Carolina,207 however, the Court did expand
the constitutional protections that are afforded some individuals–in
this case, juveniles.208 The Court held that when considering whether
a suspect knew he was free to leave when interrogated by the police,
the age of the individual needs to be taken into consideration when
determining whether Miranda warnings were required.209 It was in
J.D.B. that the Court this last Term delivered a decision that seemed
at odds with the thrust of its other holdings regarding criminal law
and procedure–the safeguards that are to be guaranteed by the Constitution were actually expanded.

206
207
208
209

Id. at 1398.
131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
Id. at 2408.
Id. at 2406.
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